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SURPRISED BY SIN*: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND UNIVERSALITY
Tawia Ansah**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the frailties of human rights as an ideal or ideology or state
practice are evident, that ideal has become a part of modern
consciousness, a lens through which to see the world, a universal
1
discourse, a potent rhetoric and aspiration.

International human rights law's claim to universality, at the level
of normative formation, has been shaped by conceptions of the self over
time. The metaphysical reconfigurations of the self, from the
Enlightenment to the present, have marked the human rights narrative in
particular ways. This essay will suggest that since World War II, a
conception of the self within a narrative of rights has. been replaced, or
at least countermanded, by a conception of sacral evil, with profound
implications for the normative claim to universality of the human rights
discourse.
The essay begins with a synoptic analysis of the rise of the claim to
universality within the international human rights narrative, followed by
the critique of universalism from the perspective of cultural relativism.
The essay will then briefly outline the complex and interesting history
of the rise and fall of the self within the Western metaphysical tradition,
in order to situate the self in relation to the human rights discourse. At
the end of that history lies the Holocaust, which begins a new story and
a new ethical framework for international human rights. I will present
two stories, one from the period immediately following the Holocaust,
and the other from the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to
suggest the consequences for the new ethics as an international human
rights praxis. I conclude with a call for the return to critical analysis, or
* Title taken from STANLEY FISH, SURPRISED BY SIN: THE READER IN PARADISE LOST
(2d ed. 1997) (hereinafter FISH).
** Tawia Ansah, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Columbia University; LL.B., University of
Toronto; Assistant Professor; Director, Center for International Law & Policy, New England
School of Law. My thanks to faculty at New England School of Law for comments and
criticisms. Thanks also to A. Michael Pierson and Edward J. Baba, both at Syracuse
University College of Law, for a superb edit of earlier portions of this article and for
stimulating conversations regarding this article, respectively.
l. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS v (2d ed. 2000).
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a cnttque of the juridical-rational self, abandoned by a resurgent
sacrality of evil at the level of normative formation within the modem
international human rights movement.
II.

THE UNIVERSALIST-CULTURAL RELATIVIST DEBATE

What makes anyone, thousands of miles away from the latest
carnage of a mass human rights violation, morally obligated to respond?
The strength and the weakness of international human rights law
reposes in its claim to universality. The claim is contested on two
levels: one is an external challenge, the other internal. Universalism is
contested, on the one hand, by the cultural relativists; on the other hand,
universalism is challenged by a critique internal to the human rights
movement as a discourse. In the following, I will briefly adumbrate the
rise of universalism within international law, and its challenge by the
cultural relativists within the past century. I argue that this "persistent
theoretical debate" within international law misses the point, because
the more profound challenge is internal to the normative
2
presuppositions of the discourse.
International human rights as a movement proceeds on the
assumption that its legitimacy "depends upon the existence and
perspicuousness of fundamental principles of justice that transcend
culture, society, and politics." Cultural relativists argue that if there are
no such transcendent principles, no absolute moral values that transcend
cultures, then international human rights loses its legitimacy. Cultural
· relativists suggest that norms and values are culturally and politically
contingent: "all values are socially constructed. On this view, values
are products of human beings, acting in particular historical and social
contexts."3 As such, they suggest that the international human rights
movement, rooted in the Western rationalist tradition, is "imperialistic"
of a particular normative structure
on the rest of the
in its imposition
4
.
world.
Guyora Binder traces universalism, as a specific claim of
international human rights, to the need for a response to the state-centric
focus of international law within the nineteenth century. As Binder puts
it, international law in the nineteenth century was "a product of the

2. Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law,
5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211 (1999).
3. /d.at214.
4. Id. at 217. See also Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of
Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J. (2001) (arguing that the norms of international human
rights law are both Western and biased against non-Western cultures and values).
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consent of sovereign states, whether manifested in treaties or in custom
and usage. This theory of international law ... securely rooted
international law's validity in the will of powerful governments - but
left little place for an international law of human rights that would
constrain these governments from mistreatin~ their own people or
persons unprotected by another government." In response, human
rights advocates "attempted to ground international human rights law on
a source of authority superior to the state." This source of authority was
a universally valid moral principle. Essentially, these advocates
suggested that, "all persons, regardless of culture, citizenship and
nationality have inherent rights which precede and condition political
societies and institutions. " 6
The source of human rights, therefore, as inhering in the
transcultural, trans-historical or "deracinated individual human beings,"
is a particular configuration of the self (or subject) as conceptualized by
the Enlightenment philosophers. 7 It was therefore open to the charge of
being culturally specific to that tradition, particularly by those from
non-western societies. 8
Cultural relativists argued that the core
instruments of international human rights law-the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights-"reflect a liberal individualism prevalent in the
West, and ignore the importance of group membership, of duties, and of
respect for nature prevalent in many non-western cultures."9 Cultural
relativists in the West also maintained that the norms embodied in those
instruments may be legitimate only inasmuch as they accord with
political cultures, and not as inhering in the subject as such. ' 0
Thus began the protracted theoretical debate between cultural
relativists and universalists. The latter suggested that the argument
against universalism is "self-contradictory," since if all values are
relative, then the value judgment that values are culturally relative

5. Binder, supra note 2, at 211.
6. Id. at 212.
7. Id. at 213.
See, e.g., Dragan Milovanovic, The Postmodernist Turn: Lacan,
Psychoanalytic Semiotics, and the Construction of Subjectivity in Law, 8 EMORY INT. L.
REV. 67, 68 (1994). "Modernist thought was a direct product of the Enlightenment.
Modernist thought was characterized by the celebration of: ... the discovery of the individual
as an autonomous, self-directing, coherent, and unified being (the idea of the centered
subject expressed best by the idea of cogito ergo sum - 'I think, therefore I am')" (emphasis
in original).
8. Binder, supra note 2, at 214.
9. Id. at 213.
10. Id. at 214.
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. own argument as a per se rue.
1 11 B.m der pomts
.
un d ercuts its
out,
however, that belief in a particular value "does not entail some
12
additional belief about the metaphysical status of the value." Binder,
in any event, resolves the issue pragmatically by suggesting that even if
the claim to universality is merely that, i.e., a claim, and there does not
in fact exist any higher metaphysical plane of norms and values that are
trans-historical, nevertheless the institutions of international human
rights law are by and large western constructs, imposing norms on
developing states which, in any event, are neo-colonial and as such also
western constructs.
As such, notwithstanding the charge of
"imperialism," since there are material benefits to the spread of human
rights-"building decent and democratic societies in a developing world
suspended between local and global cultural structures" and
"progressive social change"-the charge of imperialism should be
moot: "The problem, in short, is not that human rights standards are too
13
imperialistic, but that they are not imperialistic enough."
The external challenge to universalism outlined above is quickly
dispatched when it is evident that whether, on the one hand, there do
exist a priori rights that inhere in the individual subject, or whether this
is merely one claim amongst many, nevertheless the language of human
rights, or its discourse, has, as Alston and Steiner note, "become a part
of modern consciousness, a lens through which to see the world, a
universal discourse," even for cultural relativists in opposition to its
universal claims.
Michael Ignatieff also notes that human rights, "has become the
major article of faith of a secular culture that fears it believes in nothing
14
else."
This brings me to the second, internal critique of the
universality of human rights. Whereas the first critique was on the
ethical claim of universality, the second is on the metaphysical
possibility for universal norms and values as such, or, put another way,
on the possibility or viability of a metaphysics of human rights. This is
the attack advanced by post-Enlightenment developments in relation to
configurations of the individual subject, or the self that, as noted above,
sits at the core of an understanding of human rights. Whereas the
external critique may affect the reception or imposition of rights on non-

11. Id. at 214-215.
12. Binder, supra note 2, at 215.
13. Id. at 221. Binder also notes, "Imperialism is an intractable rea lity in the global
state system and no scheme of human rights norms will be effective unless it is
institutionalized within that imperial system." Id.
14. Michael Ignatieff, Whose Universal Values? The Crisis in Human Rights
, THE
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 1999, at 58.
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western states, the internal critique affects the self-perception of the
discourse, as well as the way we, within the discourse, see the human
rights event. It also affects how the event is remembered, and the
consequences for the way we see contingent upon memorialization.
The internal critique answers the question why, or under what rationale,
we should feel morally obligated to respond to atrocities far away. I
will argue that the reconfigurations of the self over time changed the
universalist rationale, essentially from a metaphysical to an ethical
conceptualization of the moral act, thereby shaping our response to
mass human rights violations.
III. THE SELF AND THE SACRED: CONFIGURATIONS OVER TIME

On the one hand, there is a similarity between the argument put
forward by the cultural relativists and the post-Enlightenment critics of
the metaphysical tradition, sometimes referred to as the
"postmodernists" to contrast them with the "modernists" that followed
the Enlightenment: contrary to Plato and the classical philosophers,
there may be no such thing as trans-historical moral absolutes, no such
thing as a "world of transcendent, immutable, eternal Forms or
prototypes." 15 Both cultural relativists and postmodernists are skeptical
of such certainties. Extending the argument of the former to its logical
conclusion, i.e. that rights do not inhere a priori, in some state of
"natural law" within the individual (and that the claim that it does is a
Western construct or fiction), one finds oneself squarely amongst the
postmodern philosophers, whose argument is that the metaphysical self
as juridical subject does not reside at the "center" of the discourse, does
not have "inherent rights" a priori the social, political and cultural
matrix within which she is situated. In the following I outline, in a
highly truncated form, this trajectory, and conclude by suggesting that
the central absence of the rational self is not in fact a vacuum, but rather
a specific set of postulates and yearnings.
As noted, the Enlightenment celebrated the individual as a
"centered subject." Rationalism also maintained the centrality of "the
juridic subject as an abstract bearer of rights." As Dragan Milovanovic
16
notes, "The Enlightenment was a time of optimism." It was not long,
however, before the negative side of the modernist society that followed
the Enlightenment began to be portrayed. A detailed critique of the rise
and fall of the centered subject is rather beyond the parameters of this
15. GILLIAN ROSE, MOURNING BECOMES
(1996).
16. Milovanovic, supra note 7, at 68.

LAW: PHILOSOPHY AND REPRESENTATION
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essay, but the subject's decline was probably implicit even at its height.
Friedrich Nietzsche, for instance, showed how the subject in the
modernist period was already wobbly and not so certain of its centrality:
the subject now "was weak and sought idols to overcome his or her state
in being. Semiotic fictions offered salvation. These fictions included
the idea that individuals are centered subjects (e.g., self-determining
individuals)." As Milovanovic notes, Nietzsche argued that, "These
fictions were necessary to overcome the individual's inner sense of loss;
such fictions created certainty, stability, and predictability." 17 Likewise,
Sigmund Freud altered the notion of the consciously self-determining
individual, suggesting that, "Most of what accounts for individual
behavior... was really unconscious." As such, Freud argued that the
individual "was more 'determined' than 'determining."' 18 At this
juncture, it may be said that the sovereign subject of the discourse on
human rights was herself subject to aporia, or gaps in the coherence and
seamlessness of the selfhood imagined by the Enlightenment
rationalists.
The modernist critique of the self nevertheless prepared the way
for the more thoroughgoing decapitation that followed the Second
World War. The centered self was seen as the necessary, and
lubricating, fiction of centralized Rower and domination. The ideal
"centered self' was an imperialist. 9 Milovanovic locates "the formal
take-off period of postmodernist thought" in 1960s France, at a time
when "student unrest and leftist politics dominated all aspects of
society."20 One tenet of postmodernism was "the belief that stipulating
'foundational truths' (e.g., positing truth claims for all times and
settings) that are claimed to be objective and potentially subject to the
verifyin§ test of the 'neutrality' of the scientific method were
suspect." 1 Another related tenet was "the idea that the subject was not
as centered and in control as prevalent ideologfi claimed (in fact, the
2
person became seen as the de-centered subject)."

17. Milovanovic, supra note 7, at 69.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, ERNESTO LACLAU & s LAVOJ ZIZEK, c ONTINGENCY,
HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY: CONTERMPORARY DIALOGUES ON THE LEFT 15 (2000) ("The
question of universality has emerged perhaps most critically in those Left discourses which
have noted the use of the doctrine of universality in the service of colonialism and
imperialism. The fear, of course, is that what is named as universal is the parochial property
of dominant culture, and that 'universalizability' is indissociable from imperial
expansion.").
20. Milovanovic, supra note 7, at 70.
21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Between modernism and postmodemism lies the Second World
War and, more specifically, the Holocaust. I suggest that those events
influenced the later articulation of the tenets of postmodemism in
profound ways. Indeed, the Holocaust evinced the sense of loss that
gave meaning to the de-centeredness of the subject; alternatively, the
loss of the rational self found its logical expression in the Trauerarbeit
of the Holocaust. As Jacques Derrida once famously put it, "I mourn,
therefore I am," thereby conflating two powerful normative postulates
of postmodemism: the centrality of the Holocaust, and the conscious
repudiation of the rationalist "cogito, ergo sum. " 23
Now two things can be said about this centrality of the Holocaust:
one, how it was seen and interpreted by the contemporary discursive
practices, including law (and for our purposes international human
rights law), and in philosophy more generally. The second thing to note
is how the interpretation in tum affected those discourses, or how it
entered them in specific ways, thereby enabling a certain way of seeing
other mass human rights violations. Interpretation and knowledge are
therefore reciprocal, with direct implications for the normative
24
framework of the human rights narrative. In the following, I will
adumbrate these developments, first by suggesting the ways in which
the Holocaust was interpreted, then by outlining the knowledge, within
the discursive practice of human rights, thereby produced. In both, it
will be evident that the centrality of the (metaphysical) self as
transhistorical bearer of rights, now debunked, haunts the human rights
narrative, particularly in terms of the claim to universality.
The configuration of the self and the interpretation of the
Holocaust are closely implicated. Gillian Rose suggests that the loss of
the subject in the postmodern moment did not leave a vacuum: "Postmodemism in its renunciation of reason, power, and truth identifies
itself as a process of endless mourning, lamenting the loss of securities
which, on its own argument, were none such."25 What takes the place
of the subject, or "presence," is both the "desire for presence" and "the
acceptance of absence."26 This is the characteristic of mourning, quite
different from the aporetic reading of the subject under Nietzsche's
analysis. This reading is instead determinative, since the acceptance of
23. ROSE, supra note 15, at 11.
Afler/Word(s): 'Violations of Human Dignity' and
24. See, e.g., Barbara Stark,
Postmodern International Law, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 315, 324 (2002) ("Like international
human rights law, postmodern ism is often linked to the discovery of the death camps after
World War 11.").
25. ROSE, supra note 15, at 11.
26. Id.
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absence is based on the radical repudiation of presence understood as a
centralized self, self as arbiter of sovereign, autonomous experience.
Thus, postmodernism construes the sovereign self in the first
instance by severing it from its metaphysical foundation. 27 That is,
there is no longer any room for a rationalist/universalist discourse,
totally discredited since the Holocaust. 28 The decentered self, under this
schema, is divorced from reality, or autonomous experience. Where,
that is, "knowledge, power and practical reason are attributed to the
model of the autonomous, bounded, separated, individual self, the self
within the city, 'the alliance of logic and politics,"' the analogical decentered self, to become ethical and escape the solipsism of absence
must, in Rose's words, "be devastated, traumatized, unthroned, by the
commandment to substitute the other for itself."29 This is a form of
30
"passivity beyond passivity" argued to define the postmodern self. In
short, the postmodern critique of the rational self discovered in the
Holocaust, on the one hand, the telos of rationalism, and on the other
hand, the genesis of a new ethics founded on traumatic experience.
Traumatic experience in this sense requires that the event itself be read
deterministically, that is, as a coherent, seamless whole that admits of
no aporia, no room for political or historical contingency, no
compromise. This deterministic reading of the event is a form of
sacralization.
I suggest that the de-centering' of the subject within the discourse
on human rights was replaced by the traumatic object of the Holocaust.
There are two possible reasons that this should have happened. The
first, and the most obvious reason, is the heightened emotion-and the
sense of loss-experienced in response to traumatic events. The
temptation is then to erect not only a collapse of the possibility of
transcendence-we are more than this carnage, this vulnerability, of
flesh and bones-but also to rationalize and universalize an "ethics of
the flesh," in Gary Madison's words, whereby value is inherent in the
human body as such. 31 The body is in effect fetishized and sacralized,
27. See, e.g., Gary Madison, The Ethics and Politics of the Flesh , in THE ETHICS OF
POSTMODERNJTY: CURRENT TRENDS JN CONTINENTAL THOUGHT 181 ( 1999) ("Unlike the
more deconstructive postmodems who came after him Merleau-Ponty does not deny the
'principle of universalizability' (to say that a truth-claim is rational means that it is, in
principle, universalizable), but he does seek to conceptualize it in a nonmetaphysical or
nonfoundational way.").
28. ROSE, supra note 15, at 11 ("I resist equally the super-eminence conferred on 'the
Holocaust' as the logical outcome of Western metaphysical reason ... ").
29. Id. at 37.

30. Id.
31. Madison, supra note 27, at 75 ("[A] full-fledged ethics of the flesh would be a
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replacing the metaphysical (abstract) self as the projection of
universalizability. This, Madison suggests, involves an ethics of the
flesh that is, at base, an ethics of "cruelty limitation. " 32
The second reason for the postmodern turn away from metaphysics
and toward ethics in the wake of the Holocaust is more philosophical,
and holds that the modernist critique of rationalism that required the
rejection of universality (or of the self as repository of inherent, transhistorical rights) left no ground for a new, post-Holocaust ethics, or no
metaphysical ground upon which to found a new ethics. 33 Ethics
divorced from metaphysics, as suggested, was characterized as the
"acceptance" of absence. The trauma of the Holocaust, as apotheosis
and repudiation of legal-rationality, therefore made it ripe for a kind of
34
negative universalism.
Words to describe the Holocaust, such as
"incommensurable " "ineffable " "unrepresentable " "the abyss " and
'
'
'
'
"radical evil," suggest not only intimations of the sacred, but also the
transcendent nature of the event. 35 This is precisely the project of
sacralism: to remove the event from experience, to invest it with
transcendent, ineffable meaning. It is precisely the nature of such a
project to fill the void created by the now execrated self, its attendant
"inherent rights," and its claim to universal validity.
Now, much has been said about the sacralization of the
Holocaust. 36 But what I hope to show in the following is its occurrence
within the juridical framework at a formative moment within the
modern human rights movement. That is, I hope to show the link

rational ethics laying claim to universality."
32. ROSE, supra note 15, at 6 ("In the place of this metaphysical tradition the 'ere ation
of self is to be explored independently of any theory of justice, which is thereby restricted
to the vaporous ethics of 'cruelty' limitation, learnt from modem literature and not from
analysis or philosophy.").
33. See, e.g., MARJORIE GARBER ET AL ., T HE TURN TO ETHICS ix (2000) ("The
decentering of the subject has brought about a recentering of the ethical.").
34. ROSE, supra note 15, at 27 ("The familiar structure of argument then runs as
follows: a tight fit is posited between the Holocaust and a general feature of modernity- its
legal-rationality, its architectural history, the logic of meaning itself. This leads to the
judgment that the feature in question made the Holocaust possible or realizable.").
35. See, e.g., id. ("But to name the Nazi genocide 'the Ho! ocaust' is already to overunify it and to sacralize it, to see it as providential purpose - for in the Hebrew scriptures, a
holocaust refers to a burnt sacrifice which is offered in its entirety to God without any part
of it being consumed") (emphasis in original).
36. For critical analysis the development within popular culture of the sacral ization of
Holocaust memory, see, e.g., PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE (1999).
For a more scathing and detailed analysis of the deliberate cynical deployment of "the
Holocaust" to advance vested and political interests, see, NORMAN FINKELSTEIN, THE
HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY: REFLECTIONS ON THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWISH SUFFERING (2000)
[hereinafter FINKELSTEIN].

HeinOnline -- 30 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 315 2003

316

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 30:307

between the claim to universality and the centrality of a sacralized
Holocaust at this juncture of the human rights narrative. Both
procedures are forms of legitimation. As Alston and Steiner note, "it
would be impossible to grasp the character of the human rights
movement without a knowledge about international law and its
contributions to it. The movement's aspirations to universal validity are
necessarily rooted in that body of law." 37 It makes sense, therefore, to
begin a discussion of the discourse's claim to universality in light of the
critique of the self outlined above by, first of all, seeing how the
Holocaust received a juridical (and legitimating) sacralization, how this
process enabled a claim to universal validity, and how the process of
sacralization affected the narrative of human rights over time.
So far, I have briefly sketched the beginnings of the universalist
claim of international human rights and the critique of the existence of
inherent or trans-historical rights from two perspectives: external, from
different world cultures, and internal, from within the Western
metaphysical tradition and its configurations of the self. I have
suggested that the former problematic is in part resolved if one accepts
that notwithstanding the imperialism of international human rights, the
discourse nonetheless is endemic and pervasive. I have suggested that
the cultural relativist's arguments against universality closely resemble
the critique of the self within the rationalist narrative, including the
human rights discourse, in terms of a repudiation of the metaphysical
tradition that postulates inherent, natural rights that precede specific
cultural formations. As such, the rejection of that tradition, whether
advanced by cultural relativists or postmodern theorists, arrives at the
same place.
I then argued that the de-centered self left an absence that
compromised the claim to universality. The critique of centrality left
the self vulnerable to decapitation when the Holocaust challenged the
very basis for legal-rational thought. Alternatively, the absence of the
rational self left the discourse vulnerable to the centrality of the
Holocaust as traumatic, determinate "absence." To the basic question:
why should I, thousands of miles away, feel morally obligated to
respond to the latest mass human rights violation? The normative
answer posited by a discourse with a subject that no longer roots and
centers its claim to universal application on the possibility of inherent
rights for all persons, but rather roots its legitimacy in the imponderable
existence of evil in the world, and on its discursive-juridical triumph
over evil, results in two conflicting projections.
37. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at v.
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On the one hand, the abandonment of a rational quest for
transcendent moral values, replaced by the installation (sacralization) of
"ultimate evil" as the sole transcendent truth, and as the measure of
universal validity ("I don't know whether you have 'rights' since they
are culturally contingent, but if you commit genocide you have gone
beyond the pale"), enervates the promulgation of human rights as
globally applicable, desirable and legitimate. It also compromises a
sense of human worth and dignity. We are measured by a negative
limit, and we are not seen unless we approach that limit. On the other
hand, because the ethical response is consciously post-metaphysical, its
moral appeal is largely emotional, and as such the limit case as
paradigmatic evil precludes or diminishes analysis of "lesser" human
rights violations. It also suppresses analysis as such, since the category
of ultimacy precludes intersubjective critical engagement. That is, the
inscription of ultimate evil as the source or legitimacy of the juridical
narrative bars the legal-rational apprehension and critique of the event.
In effect, the event is seen less as factual history and more as the sudden
irruption of sin, with its accreted sense of ineffability, trans-historicity,
and loss. We are always and already surprised by its existence in the
world. And by suppressing critical analysis, or what I will refer to as
contextual relativization, we deflect its complicit and teleological
implications.
IV. SACRAL EVIL AND THE FORMATION OF
A NEW ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
It has been suggested that three things occurred after World War II
in terms of the narrative of human rights: the sacralization of the
Holocaust, the critique of rationalism under a new ethics, and the
replacement of the self, reconfigured as "de-centered," with a
centralization of "radical evil" as the basis or the argument for an
extension of the universal moral obligation.
The following two stories, drawn first from Nuremberg and then
from Bosnia, are offered to explicate the following points about the
claim to universality as validating or legitimizing international human
rights. The first story shows how a juridical-sacral template is created
in relation to the Holocaust. In this story of a Nuremberg trial, I will
show two things: (1) how a deterministic reading of the event at trial
(the Holocaust) locates meaning solely in the event itself which, in tum,
objectifies the parties, or creates archetypes: monsters and saviors; and
(2) I hope to show how this response to mass atrocity sets a normative
framework for the juridical apprehension (narration) of the event. That
is, it inaugurates an ethics of refusal, and as such the claim to universal
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validity is no longer invested in positive or objective rights, but rather
as a limit, in opposition to evil. The second story suggests the
entrenchment of this procedure when the human rights movement is
confronted with another mass human rights violation in Europe. The
story is offered to suggest the unfolding of this juridical framework after
the Cold War: the archetypes are. implied in the highly schematized
division of the belligerents in the Bosnian conflict, so much so that the
elision of politics implies an absence of agents, an almost literal
iteration of the "absent subject" of postmodemity.
Kahn notes that, "The international-law scholar claims that the
legal prohibition on genocide is at the foundation of the modem
international legal order." This is because "It is the paradigm of a }us
cogens norm and thus intimately bound up with the belief in progress."
As such, "Imagining rights may be an essential step in constructing the
meaning of certain forms of violence."38 The new ethics, I suggest,
imagines rights in relation to the limit case.
One of the lesser cases at Nurember~ was the so-called "Justice
Trial," so named because Josef AltstOtter, the named defendant, and
most of the other fifteen accused, were trained lawyers, and all worked
within the judicial system of the Third Reich. The trial took place in
March, 194 7. Two of the defendants, Ernst Lautz (Chief Public
Prosecutor at the People's Court in Berlin), and Oswald Rothaug
(Director f the District Court in Nuremberg, later Public Prosecutor at
the People's Court) were convicted of "the crime against humanity of
genocide.',4° At the time, genocide did not exist sensu stricto as a crime
in any statutory or positive law; it came into existence with the
41
ratification of the Genocide Convention the following year. As such,

38. PAUL W. KAHN, T HE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 111 (1999).
39. Opening Statement for the United States ofAmerica , United States v. Alstotter et
al., Military Tibunal No. III, Case No. 3, Mar. 5, 1947 [hereinafter Alstotter]. See also,
LIPPMAN, III TRAILS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10954 (1951) [hereinafter JUSTICE JUDGMENT]. The
defendant's name is alternatively spelled Altstotter, Alstotter, Altstoetter, and Alstoetter.
The named defedant was Civil Law & Prcedure Division Chief of the Reich Ministry of
Justice, and Oberfuhrer in the SS (Die Schutzstaffeln der National Socialistishchen
Arbei terpartei).
40. JUSTICE JUDGMENT, supra note 39, at 995 (supervision of the enforcement of the
discriminatory law [Enabling Act] against Poles and Jews of December 4, 1941).
41. The definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, Article II, reads as follows:
" ... any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
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it is interesting to see how the crime is figured in the trial transcripts in
its moral, legal and political dimensions.
To circumvent the imputation that conviction was based on ex post
facto (new) law, the Nuremberg tribunal states that "the pressure of
public opinion," among other things, has led to the "international
recognition that certain crimes against humanity committed by Nazi
authority against German nationals constituted violations not alone of
statute but also of common international law."42 The tribunal went on
to note that "whether [the atrocities charged as genocide] constitute
technical violations of laws and customs of war. .. [they] were acts of
such scope and malevolence ... [and] so clearly imperiled the peace of
the world that the1 must be deemed to have become violations of
international law."4 Finally, in the absence of a statute on genocide,
the tribunal invokes the recent resolution passed by the United Nations
in condemnation of "the crime of genocide," stating that "The General
Assembly [is] the most authoritative organ [in the] interpretation of
world opinion," conceding, however, that as a political (rather than a
legislative) body, "Its [i.e. the General Assembly's] recognition of
genocide as an international crime is persuasive evidence of the fact,"
but not dispositive. 44 The Convention did not pass into law until five
years later, in 1951. Thus, albeit with trepidation, the tribunal set aside
the question whether there was a "law" as such proscribing the "crime
45
against humanity of genocide."

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions oflife calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
42. JUSTICE JUDGMENT, supra note 39, at 982.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 983; See also, U.N. (A/C.6/84), 22nd Meeting, 22 November, 1946, Mr.
Dihigo (Cuba), referring to Resolution 96 (I), "acknowledged that the General Assembly
was not a legislative body and that its recommendations could not be considered as laws, but
felt nevertheless that any measure taken by the General Assembly was vested with
incontestable authority," at 101. See also, e.g., Proceedings of the Sixth Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess, 63d-135th mtgs., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.63-A/C.6/SR.135
(1948) (hereinafter Sixth Committee Proceedings), Mr. Kaeckenbeeck (Belgium) during the
65th meeting (Paris, October 2, 1948), who notes that, "Resolution 96(1) of the Assembly
was of a declaratory character; it specified what the Assembly considered to be the law, but
it did not create law," at 22. See also G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., at 189, U.N.
Doc. A/64/Add. I (1946); the General Assembly later reaffirmed that genocide was an
international crime in G.A. Res. 180 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., at 129-130, U.N. Doc.
A/519 (1947).
45. JUSTICE JUDGMENT, supra note 39, at 983.

HeinOnline -- 30 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 319 2003

320

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 30:307

The tribunal recognizes that it has recused itself from law and
entered the realm of moral judgment, punishing the defendants "by
analogy" to crimes of war. Indeed, the prosecution, in its opening
statements regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal to try the war
criminals notes that its original authority, derived from the series of
Allied declarations during and after the war, was designed not to put the
criminals on trial (due process) but to "punish" them according to the
consensus of the Allied powers. 46 And even though jurisdiction is later
obtained through the formulation of statutory law, this initial perceived
"taint" of law as, rather than beyond, politics, remained to haunt the
proceedings at trial. 47 The resort to "universal moral judgment,"
therefore, suggests the attempt to suture this inherent problematic at the
48
heart of the creation of legal (human rights) norms.
The law's temporal and normative framework begins, then, slightly
off-balance: this is not stare decisis, but rather, law ex post facto. As if
to underline further the escape from the historicity of the event, the
rhetoric invoked by both prosecution and defense counsel is invested
with moral condemnations and sacral associations. The prosecution
concludes its opening remarks with the following statement:
In summary the defendants are charged with judicial murder and other
atrocities which they committed by destroying law and justice in
Germany, and by then utilizing the emptied forms of legal process for
prosecution, enslavement, and extermination on a vast scale .. .I have
said that the defendants know, or should know, that a court is the
House of Law. But it is, I fear, many years since any of the
defendants have dwelt therein. Great as was their crime against those
who died and suffered at their hands, their crime against Germany was

46. The prosecution's opening statements trace the tribunal's authority to the Moscow
Declaration, which holds "in relevant part: 'The above declaration is without prejudice to
the case of the major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization
and who will be punished by the joint decision of the governments of the Allies."' The
Prosecution notes that the criminals are "to be 'punished,' not necessarily tried, by 'joint
decision,' not necessarily a joint or international tribunal, of the Allies. The basic policy is
thus clearly laid down"; Altstotter, supra note 38, at 33, cited to the Moscow Declaration
(Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill), October 30, 1943, later affirmed (with France) in Potsdam,
August 2, 1945 and London, August 8, 1945 (latter also created the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg). The Allies ratified the Law 10 of the Control
Council for Germany on December 20, 1945. On October 18, 1946, the "Ordnance No. 7,
concerning the Organization and Powers of Certain Military Tribunals," created the present
American tribunal, known as Military Tribunal No. III.
47. Control Council Law No. 10. Prosecution attempts to sever relationship to political
origin of law: "We try them in an international court for crimes under international law
which finds its authority not in power or force, but in the universal moral judgment of
mankind"; Altstotter, supra note 39;at 39.
48. Altstotter, supra note 39, at 39.
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even more shameful. They defiled the German temple of justice, and
delivered Germany into the dictatorship of the Third Reich, "with all
its methods of terror, and its cynical and open denial of the rule of
49
law." The temple must be reconstructed ...

In effect, the temple rehabilitates the law as an ancient, hallowed,
even sacred, space. This is the ideal, the fantasy, of law's time and
trajectory. Fantasy notwithstanding, the stakes are high: as Kahn notes,
"A failure to maintain law appears not as a return to nature, but as a loss
50
of divine meaning and thus a state of sin." The American prosecutors,
however, are only too aware of the more sullied reality of law's moral
and political compromise and complicity within the real world. In their
quest to prove judicial murder, the prosecution cites to U.S. case law to
the effect that "the intention to commit genocide" (described as a "plan
of extermination") may be proven by the commission of acts and the
conspiracy to commit acts comprising crimes against humanity. The
case in question involves the Indiana branch of the Ku Klux Klan:
The case from which we quote arose out of the activities of the Ku
Klux Klan during the height of its powers in Indiana. The people of
the United States, on that occasion, at least, had enough courage and
foresight not to let that organization acquire the control of all its
judicial system, the way the people of Germany let these defendants
and their fellow Nazis acquire control of and pervert theirs.
Consequently, our incipient Nazis were tried. The court in the cited
case held that the proof of the doing of the overt act, was in itself
evidence of the intent of the conspirators to commit the act so as to
51
establish their intent to conspire.

Conspiracy, as the content of the crime of genocide, also informed the
same charge leveled against the United States government in 1951, the
year the Genocide Convention came into law, by a group of black
American professionals (including W.E.B. DuBois and Paul Robeson)
who called themselves the Civil Rights Congress. 52 This group filed a

49. Id. at I. (In Stanley Kramer's film,
Judgment at Nure mberg (1961), which is
loosely based on the Justice case (one of the four defendants is called Hofstetter, and all of
them are former judges under the Reich Ministry), the prosecutor says in opening
statements, "[These were] crimes committed in the name of the law ... The defendants
should have known that the courtroom is not just a court. It is a process and a spirit. It is a
house of law." Then, it is defense counsel who says, "[This trial] is dedicated to the
reconsecration of the temple of justice.").
50. KAHN, supra note 50, at 47-48.
51. Altst6tter, supra note 39, at 44, 83-84 (citing United States v. Holt, 108 F.2d 365
(7th Cir. 1935)).
52. CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS, WE CHARGE GENOCIDE: THE HISTORIC PETITION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS FOR RELIEF FROM A CRIME OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGAINST
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petition with the United Nations alleging that the US was committing
"genocide [against] the Negro People." It is a graphic document, with
pictures of lynchings in the South and vignettes described as "new acts
of genocide." A couple of examples follow:
A Florida Sheriff, Willis V. McCall, killed SAMUEL SHEPHERD
and wounded WALTER LEE IRVIN, 23-year-old Negro prisoners
whom he was driving to a re-trial which would have proven
conclusively their innocence of a false "rape" charge. Neither federal
government nor Florida officials have acted to punish Sheriff McCall
for this cold-blooded murder.

***
In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, forty police officers killed an unarmed
21-year-old Negro youth, JOSEPH AUSTIN CONWAY, allegedly
being sought for questioning in a robbery. He died in a hail of police
bullets while seeking to draw fire away from his family and
. hb ors. 53
ne1g

The petitioners begin their deposition thus:
Out of the inhuman black ghettos of American cities, out of the cotton
plantations of the South, comes this record of mass slayings on the
basis of race, of lives deliberately warped and distorted by the willful
creation of conditions making for premature death, poverty and
disease. It is a record that calls aloud for condemnation, for an end to
these terrible injustices that constitute a daily and ever-increasing
violation of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
54
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The petitioners suggest that their deposition is "historic" and
"necessary:" "We speak of progressive mankind because a policy of
discrimination at home must inevitably create racist commodities for
export abroad - must inevitably tend toward war." Furthermore,
referring to the Nuremberg prosecution's opening speech (i.e. the trial
of the major war criminals), the CRC notes: "Every word he [Robert H.
Jackson] voiced against the monstrous Nazi beast applies with equal
weight, we believe, to those who are guilty of the crimes herein set
forth." As such, the petitioners "have scrupulously kept within the
purview" of the Genocide Convention, "held to embrace those 'acts
committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical
[sic], racial or religious group as such."' In effect, the CRC alleges

THE NEGRO PEOPLE (Civil Rights Congress 1951) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS].
53. CIVIL RIGHTS CONGRESS, supra note 52, at x (prefatory page).
54. Id. at xi.

HeinOnline -- 30 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 322 2003

2003]

Human Rights And Universality

323

"mass murder on the score of 'race' ... sanctioned by law." The rhetoric
evokes similar language employed by the prosecutors in the Alstotter
case.
The CRC deposition is interesting for a number of reasons. For
one thing, it highlights the extent to which the term "genocide" is
quickly adopted within the discourse concerning human rights
violations (both international and domestic) to draw attention both to
the victim of violation and to the nature of the alleged perpetrator's
actions Uuridical murder, murder by and of law). Just as "crimes
against humanity" was, for the tribunal judges, an insufficient moniker
to characterize and condemn the events for which the defendants in
Alstotter were charged and convicted, even if it meant resorting to a
term and a figuration beyond law, so also violation at home is
heightened, and the rhetorical charge intensified, by association with the
foundational trauma. The CRC resorted to a kind of relativizing of the
trauma as a political tool, but they were not the only ones: the
prosecution also could only barely escape relativization between their
own "House of Law" and the defilement of law by the Germans. They
resist a moral parity first by signaling the close escape: "on that
occasion, at least," in reference to the Indiana case, reason and law
triumphed over passion and politics. They then escape by erecting a
"temple of justice" between themselves and the Germans' "ideological
law." In effect, the prosecution escapes from the trial as embedded
within "political time" through the moral/sacral palimpsest. I suggest
that this begins the juridical process of sacralization of the event.
A second characteristic may be observed, as suggested by this
interaction between the CRC deposition and the Nuremberg transcript:
to the extent that legal-juridical analysis is reconstructed (or reconsecrated) by a sacral view of the event through a suppression of
political contingency, a different construction of the observed object
comes into view. Essentially, the observer and the observed are
radically severed. There is no possibility for the intersubjective
knowledge as between objects, or to affirm a politics of reciprocity.
The distance between the Germans and the Americans is a sacralized
opposition between demonic reason (or anti-reason) and the law as an
ethics of refusal, a refusal to analyze and, as such, to relativize. The
view of Auschwitz as the "end-product and telos of modem rationality"
suggests a legal post-rationalist ethics that-has no other foundation but
its refusal of evil. 55 No discourse is possible between objects on
different sides of the divide. The escape from relativism, therefore, will
55. ROSE, supra note 15, at 34.
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engender a way of being in the world, a world radically split between
good and evil.
Take one more example, this time from the German perspective.
Counsel for the accused noted, in response to the alleged destruction of
law (anti-reason), that on the contrary, during the Third Reich, law was
vindicated not, however, as a doctrinal corpus that required selfless
genuflection regardless of material and spiritual exigencies, but rather in
the form of reified ideology, a new and higher law, transcending mere
positive law. To the German judiciary under the Third Reich, the
message repeated time and again was of the insufficiency of positive or
formal law and the necessity to obtain, well, a temple of justice of sorts,
an aesthetic ideal of purity of the race/nation that recalls, at one register,
the purgative haunt of Jim Crow. But the Nazi regime needed formal
law to achieve its pure destiny, just as the CRC alleges the necessity of
law to lubricate the wheels of race destruction. 56
The prosecution concedes, in fact, that as things became more
difficult for the Germans during the war they produced more, not less,
conventional law. 57 From the American perspective, the elevation of
ideology to law, a flagrant conurbation of law and politics, is anathema
to a moral schema. From the German perspective, it is precisely a
moral principle that justifies the movement from politics as source of
law to politics as law. The State is defined by the desire for fixed
identity boundaries. That is, the higher law is in effect "the people's
law," law reconceived as the will or desire for purified sovereign
identity. And purity, as Joseph Goebbels puts it, requires the highest
expediency, even if this leads to injustice:
During a war it is not so much a matter of whether a judgment was
just or unjust but only whether the decision is expedient. The state
must protect itself in the most efficient way and wipe them out
entirely... One must not proceed from the law, but from the resolution
56. One might even say race construction. See, e.g., MICHAELS, WALTER BENN, THE
SOULS OF WHITE FOLK, in LITERATURE AND THE BODY: ESSAYS ON POPULATIONS AND
PERSONS 192 (1988) (who suggests that through history, constitutional interpretation and the
case law (e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 540-52 (1896)), American jurisprudence has
constructed an American race: "[I]nsofar as the question, Are you white? has been and
continues to be successfully replaced by the question, Are you American? - insofar, that is,
as a question supposedly about biology has been preserved as a question supposedly about
national identity - one might say that the very idea of American citizenship is a racial and
even racist idea, racist not because it embodies a (more or less concealed) preference for
white skins but because it confers on national identity something like the ontology of
race.").
57. Altstotter, supra note 39, at 48. ("But the war also brought about a mass of new
criminal legislation within Germany. This new legislation was influenced by the necessities
of war, but also contained mature concepts of National Socialist criminal policy.").
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One suspects that the "man" in question is not just the criminal or the
deviant, but the individual per s e. Such a movement from the
individual to the state, a "far-reaching revolution in domestic and
foreign policies," 59 is difficult and bloody: Rothenberger, one of the
defendants at bar, once phrased the issue, in a paper on judicial reform
(before Hitler elevated him to high office in the judiciary), in surgical
terms:
The present crisis in the administration of justice today is close to such
a climax. A totally new conception of the administration of justice
must be created, particularly a National Socialist judiciary, and for this
the druggist's salve is not sufficient; only the knife of the surgeon, as
60
will later be shown, can bring about the solution.

If the implication of the argument here is the relativization of evil,
then it is merely in order to return us, as it were, to a critical reflection
at the borderline that severs us from politically active and engaged
interaction with the other side. We are absolved from this task-we are
exempted from political analysis by the "bar" of an emotional
response-when we sacralize the event, particularly when that event sits
at the fulcrum of the human rights movement. But absolution is
precisely the felt need of an eschatological ethics of refusal, which is
supposed to have saved us from just such a reflection at the border.
And although it may be contended that justice requires distinctions and
creates hierarchies of criminality both at the domestic and at the
international level, the hierarchy posited by the adjudication and
deployment of genocide as ultimate and sacral embeds the event not in
legal or historically contested time, where we see the equal investment
and rage of self and other, but in trans-historical time.
In the result, figuring law as an ancient temple in need of
reconstruction, law memorializes the event (the Holocaust) as the sacred
ground from which was to spring the normative claim to universal
validity. We see mass human rights violations within the world under
the category of ultimacy. As such, and divorced from (historical)
reality, we are surprised by evil as an ontological absence of the self and
its complicities. 61 In the following story, I wish to explore the extent to

58. Id. at 46 (cited to Speech before the Members of the People's Court, 22 July, 1942).
59. Altstotter, supra note 39, at 498.
60. Altstotter, supra note 39, at 498.
61. "Absence" as the foundation of an ethical framework can be compared with the
solipsism of "desire," as in the following formulation by Madison, following MerleauPonty, on the ethics of the flesh: " ... consciousness is the desire of the desire of another
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which this normative structure still operates to immure us within, I
suggest, our innocence before transgression.
V.

SACRAL PALIMPSEST: THE NON-AGENTIAL SUBJECT
IN THE CASE OF BOSNIA

When the UN prosecutors opened the Bosnia and Croatia phase of
Slobodan Milosevi_'s trial with the charge of genocide, Milosevi_
dismissed the charges, 61 in all, arguing that the Serbs were simply
defending themselves within the context of a civil war: "I invested all
my power in achieving peace. Serbia and myself deserve recognition
for working for peace in the area and not being a protagonist of war," he
said. 62 The prosecutor, Geoffrey Nice, replied: "[t]he systematic and
organized way in which attacks against non-Serb civilian populations in
Croatia were carried out revealed a carefully designed scheme and
strategy within an overall plan that may be laid at the door of this
63
accused. "
What may be equally interesting, however, is the reportage of the
trial, as concerning "Europe's worst human rights violations since
World War II," and "the biggest international war crimes trial in Europe
since Hitler's henchmen were tried at Nuremberg."64 References and
comparisons to epochal historical events and traumas are of course
inevitable. What may be less self-evident is how these references
operate on temporal memory and, as such, shape our responses to
atrocity.
The political and moral capture of specific memory toward a
narrative of the event that will articulate, for all time, the historical
record is, of course, nothing new. But what I have attempted to explore
is the law's method of capture when the context is a massive human
rights violation, mass death.
Confronted once again with
incommensurable evil, the question is: will the law's response once
more take an elliptical, archetypal form regarding the story of the other,
similar to the Alstotter case? How, in other words, will Bosnia be
consciousness. This is exactly what the reversibility of the flesh means; already in the
depths of the sensible, our being is communication." Madison, supra note 27, at 179.
Because I see a parity between absence and desire in the repudiation of the metaphysical
self, I disagree with Madison that his formulation is a Hegelian "ethics of reciprocity or an
ethics of recognition," since its theoretical basis is too jejune to adjudicate between different
corporeal speech acts (one person's pain is another's martyrdom, etc.): Id. at 178.
62. Reuters, Prosecutors Open Genocide Case Against Milosevic , N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 2002, available at: http://www.genocidewatch.org/milosevicgenocide.htm (last visited
March. 20, 2003).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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"remembered" in light of the comparisons to the Holocaust? I argue
that the category of ultimacy outlined above affects the way Bosnia, or
any other large-scale atrocity, is memorialized by the discourse. We do
not make references to the Holocaust lightly. Its centripetal force
within the human rights discourse means that we are always surprised
by evil, permitting, as noted, a deflection of our own rage and
investment. In the following story, then, we move from radical evil as
the rational/universal limit case, creating discursive archetypes at the
borderline of sin, to a postmodern story of conflict in which the
archetypal narrative is so implicit and entrenched that we take the
absence of politics, and of the agential subject, for granted.
Notwithstanding various attempts in the intervening years, or since
World War II, to distinguish "genocide" from "the Holocaust," the
incipient link, and the sense of ultimacy that the linkage accrued, was
embedded within the normative and prohibitory formation. 65 As such,
when faced with the first post-Cold War mass atrocity in Europe, it was
not surprising that not only would the term genocide be deployed, but
that the meaning of the Holocaust should characterize and underwrite
the juridical apprehension of the event.
But the legal instrument, i.e. the Genocide Convention of 1948
was, by itself, insufficient to characterize the crimes committed in
Bosnia-Herzegovina as genocide. The violence there both exceeded the
specific legal parameters - the physical, psychological, economic
damage - even as the criminality as such did not reach or conform to
the elements of the legal instruments. What to do? This is how the
Commission of Experts, empanelled by the United Nations in 1993 to
investigate war crimes and collect evidence for the yet-to-be-constituted
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, set about fitting the
definition of genocide to the events still unfolding before the world in
the winter of 1993. 66 I suggest that the need to characterize the events
65. See, e.g., David Rieff, An Age of Genocide, THE NEW REPUBLIC, January 29, 1996,
at 35-36 (arguing that time should have sundered the relationship between the Holocaust
and genocide but, as a result of the centrality of the extermination of the Jews, "the
Holocaust may have come not only to define the issue, but also to confuse it. .. And in this
way the Holocaust may be used to exonerate many crimes and many criminals." NOVICK,
supra note 36, at 14 (" ... but making it [the Holocaust] the benchmark of oppression and
atrocity ... trivializes crimes of lesser magnitude. It does this not just in principle, but in
practice. American debate on the bloody Bosnia conflict of the 1990s focused on whether
what was going on was 'truly holocaust or merely genocidal;' 'truly genocidal or merely
atrocious.'").
66. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992J, UN S/1994/674 [hereinafter Final Report). S.C. Res. 827,
U.N. SCOR, 4glh Sess. 3217 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993) (The Security Council
established the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
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as genocide reflected the same concern - how do we see and remember
a massive and violent event? - as that which informed the subjects in
the above story: the need to construct the object as separate from the
subject by a border of innocence. In the result, Bosnia, in its complexly
violent historical particularity, was placed under erasure.
The three elements of the Convention definition that the
Commission had to address were the definition of protected group, the
meaning of intent, and the jurisdiction of the crimes. The intent
requirement in the Convention is generally understood to mean
"specific intent," but Cherif Bassiouni, who headed the Commission
and later wrote a treatise on the Yugoslav Tribunal's statute, suggested
that this requirement is "too rigid."67 Stressing that the law is.
"evolutionary," Bassiouni and the Commissioners suggest that the
provisions of the Convention be interpreted "in a spirit consistent with
its purposes."68 In his treatise, Bassiouni characterized the intent
requirement as follows:
In most countries, penal codes do not regard motives, rather only

intent, as the subjective or mental constituent element of a crime.
Motive and intent may be closely linked, but motive is not mentioned
in the Convention. The necessary element of intent may be inferred
from sufficient facts. In certain cases, there will be evidence of
actions or omissions of such a degree that the defendant may
reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the consequences of his
or her conduct, which goes to the establishment of intent, but not
. 69
necessan·1y motive.

The Commissioners' Final Report likewise shifts the emphasis from the
mens rea, or mental element, to the physical or material element of the
crime, i.e. sufficient facts, rather than persuasive or corroborative
evidence of a specific intent, will be dispositive, or will determine
whether the crime at issue has been committed. 70 Motive, which

Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 in Security Council Resolution 827. The Statute was also adopted
by the same resolution on May 25, 1993.).
67. M. C HERIF BASSIOUNI & P ETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 531 (l 996).
68. Id. at 523 ("As emphasized in the preamble to the Convention, genocide has marred
all periods of history, and it is this tragic recognition that gives the concept its historical
evolutionary nature."). Final Report, supra note 66, at 25 para. 94.
69. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 67, at 524.
70. Final Report, supra note 66, at 71 para. 314 ("Knowledge of these grave breaches
and violations of humanitarian law can reasonably be inferred from consistent and repeated
practices.").
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Bassiouni also calls "ultimate aim or purpose," becomes irrelevant.
Thus, the argument is that it is irrelevant whether, say, the Bosnian
Serbs' aim or purpose (political objective) is to claim territory or to
exterminate a group as such. The commission of acts of violence
suffices to characterize the nature of the events either as war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide, and so on.
Bassiouni and the experts move on two grounds for a shift or
expansion of the legal concept of genocide: what is inscribed in
domestic penal codes, and what is understood as the "purpose" of the
Convention of 1948. In a sense, the specific provisions of the
Convention are circumvented and replaced by those found in penal
codes to arrive at the Convention's purpose, which is characterized as
evolutionary, fluid and changing: as the penal codes of municipal law
change, they reflect the evolution in the purpose of the Convention. But
purpose, understood in these evolving terms, becomes both the central
trope of the law and its irrelevance. That is, under this evolutionary
interpretation of the Convention provisions, legal purpose irradiates
outward, overshadowing the purpose or aims of the actors themselves.
But at the center of this central trope are the dispositive acts of the
perpetrator, standing on their own.
In effect, the Commission escapes the rigidity of the written
provisions - which it severs from the underwriting purpose of the
provisions, which purpose having been released from the written
document is then filled in, interpreted, according to the writings (penal
codes) of states parties (the international community) - with a new form
of rigidity, for once the acts become virtually the sole determinative
criteria, the legal perspective here gets locked into a specific vignette, a
narrative that dictates what the purpose of the law and, by subsumption,
of the others (perpetrator and victim) will be. I will attempt to clarify
these points in the following.
First, the Commission defines what the Convention really means
by "protected group." Beginning with the proviso that genocide is the
intent to destroy a group "in whole or in part," the Commission then
goes on to note that, "If essentially the total leadership of a group is
targeted, it could also amount to genocide," that is, "the totality per se
may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the actual numbers
killed. A corroborating argument will be the fate of the rest of the
72
group." The Commission then determines that "group" may in fact
consist of several groups or collectivities:
71. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 67, at 524-25.
72. Final Report, supra note 66, at 25 para. 93-94.
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If there are several or more than one victim groups, and each group as
such is protected, it may be within the spirit and purpose of the
Convention to consider all the victim groups as a larger entity. The
case being, for example, that there is evidence that group A wants to
destroy in whole or in part groups B, C and D, or rather everyone who
does not belong to the national, ethnic, racial or religious group A. In
a sense, group A has defined a pluralistic non-A group using national,
ethnic, racial and religious criteria for the definition. It seems relevant
to analyse the fate of the non-Ajjroup along similar lines as ifthe nonA group had been homogenous.

The report thus incorporates the perspective - the purpose - of group A
within the "spirit and purpose" of the law:
Genocide, an "odious scourge" which the Convention intends "to
liberate mankind from" (preamble), would as a legal concept be a
weak or even useless instrument if the overall circumstances of mixed
groups were not covered. The core of this reasoning is that in oneagainst-everyone-else cases the question of a significant number or a
significant section of the group must be answered with reference to all
·..
M
the target groups as a larger whole.

Bassiouni, in his later treatise, goes further in defining "group" for the
purposes of the Genocide Convention in terms of geography:
One could also define the group as all Muslims in a given area of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as Prijedor, ifthe intent of the perpetrator is
the elimination of that narrower group ... it may be possible to
consider the inhabitants of a given area irrespective of their religion as
part of the entire group, as well as an identifiable group on its own,
protected in either case by the Genocide Convention as incorporated in
article 4 of the [Hague Tribunal] Statute. For example, all Bosnians in
Sarajevo, irrespective of ethnicity or religion, could constitute a
. 75
protected group.
·

Turning to the question of the acts involved as central to
understanding the purpose of the law, the Commission notes, quoting
from its earlier interim report, that "' [t]he expression, "ethnic
cleansing," is relatively new,"' defining it as "'rendering an area
ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove
persons of a given group from the area. "'76 The acts that describe ethnic

73. Id. at 25-26 para. 96.
74. Id. at 25-26 para. 96.
75. BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 67, at 531 (citing to the Statute for the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).
76. Final Report, supra note 66, at 33 para. 129 (citing "First Interim Report," UN
S/25274, para. 55).
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cleansing as the "policy and practices conducted in the former
Yugoslavia ... by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and
detention," and so on, "could also fall within the meaning of the
77
Genocide Convention."
The report distinguishes between ethnic cleansing as simply
"contrary to international law" and ethnic cleansing as genocide: the
latter is a matter of policy: "With respect to the practices by Serbs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, 'ethnic cleansing' is commonly
used as a term to describe a policy conducted in furtherance of political
78
As such, the object and
doctrines relating to 'Greater Serbia. "'
purpose of the legal perspective-the task of the experts-is in
determining that the Serbs, "group A," undertook to ethnically cleanse
conquered territory during the conflict, whereas the "non-A group" did
not, or alternatively, that it is only group A which exercises a political
doctrine relative to a "greater" nation state:
Ethnic cleansing practices committed by Bosnian Croats with support
from the Republic of Croatia against Bosnian Muslims in Herzegovina
are politically related. Furthermore, Croatian forces also engage in
these practices against Serbs in the Krajina area and in eastern and
western Slavonia. The violence committed against Serbs in these
areas appears, however, to have the more defined political aim of
79
removing them from the areas.

The Commission then catalogues some of the military and
paramilitary actions taken by the Croatian government or with its
support to remove "non-A group" (non-Croat) members from Croatian
territory, noting en passant that, "Similar practices were also, on
occasion, carried out by Croats [from Croatia] against Muslims in
Bosnia and Herzegovina." The Commission concludes, however, that
"the Croatian authorities have publicly deplored these practices and
sought to stop them, thereby indicating that it is not part of the
Government's policy." 80
.
There appear to be a few small anomalies in this rendition of the
conflict. For instance, the term "ethnic cleansing," rather than being
new and per se redolent of Serbian policy as such, may have been used
during the Second World War by different parties. In other words, the
term has a complex history of its own. Bette Denich, in her analysis of
the historical roots of the recent conflict in Yugoslavia, notes the

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. (citing "First Interim Report," UN S/25274, para. 57).
Final Report, supra note 66, at 33 para. 131.
Final Report, supra note 66, at 36 para. 147.
Id.
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following earlier use:
In the words of an Ustasha official, spoken at the outset of the [ 194142) massacres, 'This country can only be a Croatian country, and there
is no method that we would hesitate to use in order to make it truly
Croatian and cleanse it of Serbs, who have for centuries endangered us
81
and who will endanger us again if they are given the opportunity.'
Second, it is unclear to what extent it was only one group that at
least for a time propagated the desire for a "greater" or homogenous
national state. This point gets a little complicated, as the idea itself,
regardless of the desire, was manipulated by all sides. Here's Susan
Woodward on how the Serbs and Croats confused the issue, making it
unclear, even to the majority of Bosnians, what the Bosnian Muslim
leadership may have sought
Thus, contrary to those who saw the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an
extension of the Croat-Serb conflict, secessionist Serbs and Croats had
a common interest in playing up the issue of religious identity in order
to deny the veracity of President [Alija] Izetbegovic's commitment to
a secular Bosnian state, and his claim to represent all Bosnians.
Izetbegovic reflected this tension through a damaging inconsistency in
speech and action. He and his SDA could never decide what
constitutional arrangement would best serve the Muslim nation once
Croatia declared independence-an alignment with the federal
government in Belgrade, with Zagreb as an independent state and
against Bosnian Serbs, or with Serbs in a downsized federal
. 82
Yugos 1avia.
The consequences of this inconsistency were keen: not only did the
SDA give "varying impressions of the meaning of Bosnia itself,"
including the idea of a greater Muslim state, but this thereby "made
consistent propaganda difficult, left those who identified themselves as
Bosnians without a reliable protector, and allowed the international
83
community to be inconsistent in its approach also. "

81. Bette Denich, Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic
Revival of Genocide, 21 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 367, 375, (citing ALEKSA DJILAS, THE
CONTESTED COUNTRY: YUGOSLAV UNITY AND COMMUNIST REVOLUTION 1919 - 1953, 119
(1991).
82. SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE
COLD WAR 301 ( 1995).
83. Id. at 301 ("They also gave varying impressions of the meaning of Bosnia itself - as
a former federal unit of Yugoslavia with a legitimate historical state legacy of its own; as a
state of the Muslim nation; or as a convenience on the road to a larger Muslim unit to
include areas such as the Sandzak in Serbia and Montenegro, which were numerically
majority Muslim areas and one-time Ottoman provinces.").
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Woodward goes on to explain how propaganda was deployed to
further "military objectives," whereby the more successful the
propaganda, the more successful the military campaign; the less
successful, the more numerous the victim count. In the result, "Because
the Bosnian government forces and the Muslim paramilitaries had to
fight a war on two fronts, they would inevitably have more dead,
injured, and displaced. As an indirect result of their larger numbers and
as a direct result of Bosnian Serb and Croat policy, Muslim civilians
84
were the most numerous victims of the war." This would seem at least
to query the view of the experts at the Commission that only one side
had a policy whereas the others had limited political obiectives, or
indeed what the difference is between these two descriptives. 5
Third, the conduct of the Croats in Krajina and in BosniaHerzegovina seems to contradict the thesis that it is a one-againsteveryone-else conflict as a general rule. That there may be a group A
and a non-A group in a specific region-Prijedor, Krajina-seems less
significant, in the Commission's analysis, than the number and scope of
violations as determinative of a policy with respect to the violations.
Policy, again, seems tied to the idea of a one-against-everyone-else
ethnic or religious conflict. That is, if the violations seem more
pervasive for one group than for another, then the conclusion must be
that the latter had a "limited political objective" as compared with the
former, which had a "policy." Bolstering this argument is the view that
if the "objective" is condemned by the government, it cannot be the
government's policy.
And since the Franjo Tudjman regime
condemned the practice-which did not prevent it from conducting, late
in the war, what some allege to have been the largest instance of ethnic
cleansing-it is deemed a matter only of limited political objective. 86

84. Id. at 301-02 ("The consequence was that foreign reporters, official invest igations,
politicians, and human rights organizations expressed outrage at the genocidal policy of the
Bosnian Serbs (similar Bosnian Croat tactics were said to be in self-defense) and thus
focused attention increasingly on the rights of Muslims, not Bosnians. Those who needed
the greatest international support received ever less.").
85. On the question of"policy," see also Charles Simic, Urifashionable Victims 19
LONDON REvIEW OF BOOKS 15, July 31, 1997, at 13-14 ("Serbs have never had a clear-cut
national programme. I'm 59 years old and have had innumerable political discussions with
Serbs of every description, but the subject of Greater Serbia has never come up. We are
more likely to make fun of our national pretensions .... [T]he idea of 'Greater Serbia' was a
half-baked scam, 'Plan B' set out after Milo_evi_'s other schemes to extend his power over
the rest of Yugoslavia had collapsed.").
86. See, e.g., James Petras & Steve Vieux, Bosnia and the Revival of U.S. Hege many,
NEW LEFT REvIEW, July-August 1996, at 3, 15 ("In this slaughterhouse the only moral issue
for the media was Serbian atrocities against the Bosnian Muslims. No one would know
from the nightly news or from the daily newspapers that Croatia ran brutal detention camps
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In actual fact, then, it would appear that object and purpose do
become important for the experts in determining the criminality of the
perpetrator. But it would seem to be the legal perspective, as construed
by the Commission, that determines the purpose, evidently according to
the scope of the acts committed and with little resort to the perspectives
or the felt needs (political objectives, policies) of the parties involved:
how, for example, the Croatian government can support, through its
"Croatian Defence Council, police, armed civilians and local special
forces," the practice of ethnic cleansing, how the practice is related to or
evidence of a political purpose, and yet not be deemed government
"policy," is unclear.
Thus, according to the experts' analysis, the law's evolving, fluid
nature involves containment: the tensions, contradictions and sheer
messiness of internecine war are suppressed under a more streamlined
and symmetrical view of conflict as defined by the Convention. The
particular agency, or the rage and passion of the belligerents, gives way
to precision and distance. On the one hand, it may be said that one
motive engendering the need to square the conflict in Bosnia and
Croatia with the definition of genocide may be the shock and horror of
such massive violence and the evident ferocity amongst the
87
belligerents. Genocide, if one presupposes the aforementioned link to
the Holocaust and the "ultimacy" of the crime, would then be the most
appropriate vehicle for expressing one's moral outrage and horror of the
events in the present instance. On the other hand, the Commissioners
may, in 1993 in the midst of the conflict, have felt a need to draw the
world's attention to the victimization in Bosnia. Such a political
deployment of the term would only work if the term resided within the
popular imagination as a particularly egregious crime. Both motives,
emotive and political, nevertheless have the effect of catering not to the
particularity of the events under observation but rather to a kind of
resurrection, or analepsis. The legal analysis is characterized by a
strategy of elision, and we are invited to see the conflict, to "remember"

or that it planned and carried out the largest single episode of ethnic cleansing in the war.
Such facts were inconvenient for the U.S. government's justification of its own policy and
therefore ignored. Once again the mass media convinced the bulk of liberal and progressive
opinion-makers that U.S. intervention was needed for a high moral purpose.").
87. Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina Hearings before the U.S. Congressional
Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 104 Cong. l st Sess., (April 4, 1995)
(statement of Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman, United Nations Commission of Experts to
Investigate Violations in the Former Yugoslavia) ("[A]bove all, the ferocity with which
harm was inflicted is particularly shocking ... not only the physical, but the psychological
consequences of their victimization. As I stated earlier, it is the ferocity of the victimization
that is particularly shocking.").
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it, as paradigmatic, as something other than it is.
I do not mean to suggest that the only conflict that would fit the
definition of genocide must needs resemble either the symmetry, if there
ever were such a thing (see the Alstotter case), or the magnitude of the
Holocaust. Indeed, in both of these stories, complexity gave way to the
simple, dichotomized and non-coeval distance between subject and
object. Nor do I believe that it should be impossible for a legal analysis
to provide a complicated and "thick" description of an event, without
resorting to a "moral equivalence" between the parties. 88 What I do
suggest is that if these two cases are any measure of how mass human
rights violations are addressed under the law, then both exhibit a
tendency toward a normative disaggregation between subject and
object, between observer and observed. Notwithstanding the need to
identify and punish the perpetrators of violent crimes, this
disaggregation, I maintain, is at odds with an aspirational adherence to
the rubric of equal rights for all or, put another way, to the rule of law as
the rational essence of the human rights discourse, and as the claim to
universality on that basis.
VI.

CONCLUSION: SACRALITY,

Loss,

AND MOURNING.

If the rule of law is historical, then the interpretation and projection
of the Holocaust, within the normative framework of the human rights
discourse as trans-historical, is a repudiation of the rationality of the
law. In this context, to project is to disown. But this is precisely a
consequence of the sacralization of the Holocaust within the discourse
of human rights: that is, by constructing the Holocaust as the
foundational image, or founding imaginary, of the human rights
discourse, the discourse reverts, from its legal-rational principles, to a
more sacred or ultimate temporality. Ultimacy as the measure of
experience bars us from seeing the event as historical and relational, and
from seeing ourselves as juridical subjects situated within, and
implicated by, that history.
What is the alternative? It has been suggested here that one view,
notwithstanding the initial discomposure of settled perceptions of good
and evil, is to relativize or, put another way, to view genocidal conflict
88. See, e.g., Final Report, supra note 66, at 52 para. 277 (For no reason that I can
ascertain, the report notes that the Muslim detention centers are equally violative of
international law but, unlike their more famous Serbian counterparts, characterizes them as
"individual violations." Id. In the same vein, the Commissioners note, in reference to the
Bosnian Muslim practice of ethnic cleansing, that quantitatively and, therefore qualitatively,
"there is no factual basis for arguing that there is a 'moral equivalence' between the warring
factions." Id. at 36-37, para. 148-149).
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as complexly and obdurately historical. Relativizing experience is
always contextual, however. Novick reminds us that when the Germans
attempted to pass a law in the 1980s against denying the Holocaust, the
price for supporting it was to include a provision making it illegal to
deny the suffering of Germans expelled from the East after 1945. "In
this context - and context, as always, is decisive-'relativization' meant
equating crimes against Germans to crimes by Germans. Which, of
course, many Germans wished to do." 89 Germans who posited the
uniqueness of the Holocaust attempted, in this context, to block the
evasion of a confrontation "with a painful national past."90 The same
posit of ultimacy and incomparability within the US "performs the
opposite function: it promotes evasion of moral and historical
responsibility. The repeated assertion that whatever the United States
has done to blacks, Native Americans, Vietnamese, or others pales in
comparison to the Holocaust is true-and evasive."91
Not all events are posited against the Holocaust, to be sure, but this
essay has argued that situating the sacral image of the Holocaust at the
center of the discourse, as the legitimating rational/juridical exegesis of
universalizability, has consequences for how we see events over time. I
have suggested that this fixation of the sacral creates the new, postrationalist ethics of the discourse that rejects legal-rational analysis in
its refusal of experience under the category of evil, or sin. As such,
witnessing any other mass human rights atrocity-Kosovo comes to
mind, as well as 9/11-creates a sense of shock and surprise, as if our
own actions abroad have no political consequences. 92 Consider also the
suggestion that the Milosevi_ trial is about "the worst human rights
violation since World War II": such a rhetoric not only diminishes other
atrocities, it also evades our own complicity in the fall of Yugoslavia.
How we see and remember mass human rights violations situates
us within the world in certain ways. I do not propose an antidote to
sacralization. On the contrary, sacralism is itself not only not the issue
as such, but is also quite likely the most inevitable response to largescale traumatic events, a natural element of the mourning process. 93

89. NOVICK, supra note 36, at 14 (emphasis in original).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
92. See, e.g., Mark Taylor, The World Trade Center Proposals: Beyond Mour ning,
Building Hope on Ground Zero, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at 40 ("This ground was not
only haunted; it was also sacred.").
93. Sacralism as part of the mourning process posits the ineffability of the event. See,
e.g., id. at 40 ("It is necessary to find ways to remember, memorialize and mourn without
becoming obsessed with a past we will never understand) (emphasis added).
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Sacralism is, however, a largely emotional response to events. To the
extent that the juridical apprehension of the event is determined by the
elements of sacralism (the sacral object displaces the rational subject),
the event is seen not as history but as archetype, a morality play (or
Trauerspiel) without moral agents. My attempt here has been to
reframe our experience of mass violence, to resituate it within a rational
apprehension of the subject/self. We on this side of the border of
innocence, and they on the other, are equally enraged, equally invested
in the outcome of the political and aporetic struggle for human rights.
Once the event is characterized as ultimate, and therefore universally
determinate, we have nothing more to say.
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